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Daubert and Its Discontents 
Ronald J. Allen† and Esfand Nafisi‡ 
I. INTRODUCTION* 
The law suffers from serious informational 
vulnerability. The legal system has no independent body of 
knowledge from which to determine rights and obligations, but 
rather is dependent upon external sources—witnesses and 
exhibits—to present information from which the facts will be 
found.1 Parties presenting these sources of evidence, and 
sometimes the sources themselves, may have mixed incentives 
to present truthfully, depending upon whether the truth yields 
a desirable result. The law’s solution to this problem is to 
commit the task of fact finding to disinterested individuals, 
either jurors or judges, who are fully aware of the foibles of 
human existence. They are asked to process and rationally 
deliberate upon what the parties present in order to determine 
the most plausible explanation of the events being litigated.  
The law largely permits parties to present whatever 
relevant evidence there is and explore the veracity of that 
evidence at trial. The operating assumption, and the deepest 
aspiration of the legal system, is that this process will facilitate 
the accurate resolution of disputes upon which the rights and 
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 * We, like many others, were both inspired and provoked by the work of the 
late Professor Margaret A. Berger. In the article that follows we acknowledge much of 
the wisdom of her views and attempt to demonstrate where and why, in some 
instances, we differ. We had hoped this article would spark a dialogue with her, which 
is one of the reasons we published it in her home journal. 
 1 In fact, the matter is a bit more complicated, as most of the evidence is 
imported to a trial by whomever the decision maker is. See generally Ronald J. Allen, 
Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604-40 (1994); Ronald J. 
Allen & Alicia L. Carriquiry, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence Reconsidered: 
A Dialogue Between a Statistician and a Law Professor, 31 ISR. L. REV. 464 (1997).  
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obligations of the parties depend. Without factually true 
findings, rights are meaningless.2 
The process of litigation seems to work fairly well for 
the most part. The fact that very few cases reach the trial 
stage3 suggests that only highly contentious disputes need be 
resolved by a third-party fact finder. The reason it works well 
is largely because the fact finders—jurors or judges—are 
cognitively competent and properly motivated to find the facts 
accurately. Mistakes can be made, but the typical issue at trial 
is within the understanding of the decision makers. There are 
some cases, however, that pose a challenge to the deep 
aspiration of accurate dispute resolution. Some litigated 
controversies require access to organized bodies of knowledge 
that are not within the grasp of the intelligent layman, judge, 
or juror. Radiology, oncology, metallurgy, organic chemistry, 
and psychology are but a few examples. Since the development 
of the legal system, our society has changed from one of largely 
common knowledge, with only a few isolated bodies of 
specialized knowledge, to a society abounding in specialties and 
subspecialties. This increasing stratification of knowledge has 
caused informational vulnerability within the law. The law 
needs access to these specialized bodies of knowledge; indeed, it 
needs to know them—but it does not and realistically cannot. 
This dilemma explains the law’s struggle to domesticate 
expert evidence: if the operating assumption is that the law 
needs access to an organized body of knowledge that it cannot 
assimilate, then the solution must lie in some formal criteria 
that take the place of substantive knowledge. In other words, 
the law must have a mechanism for evaluating the 
admissibility of evidence that judges and juries do not know 
enough about to evaluate for themselves.  
  
 2 Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a 
trial is the determination of truth . . . .”); see also Ronald J. Allen, Explanationism All 
the Way Down, 5 EPISTEME 320, 321-22 (2008) (“All rights and obligations are 
meaningless without accurate fact finding. Whether the issue is the age of adulthood, 
the right to an abortion, the various powers of government, or your right to possess, 
consume, and dispose of your clothes, it is the conditioning of rights and obligations on 
facts that gives them substance. This is the feature that most distinguishes liberal 
democracies and market economies from autocratic states and centralized economies, 
and the consequences are obvious.”). 
 3 In 2001, only 3% of all civil cases went to trial. Thomas H. Cohen & Steven 
K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. (Apr. 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ctcvlc01.htm. Plaintiffs won 
55% of those cases. Id. 
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The Frye4 test is the paradigmatic example.5 Motivating 
the Frye test is the simple but compelling assumption that 
deference to knowledge can substitute for rational deliberation. 
Even though the fact finder may not possess the knowledge to 
decide the case, it can defer decision to someone who does, and 
simply embrace that person’s conclusion as its own. Thus the 
provenance of the general acceptance test is the sentiment that 
“[s]cience is the only source of its own reliability.”6 What better 
ground to defer to expertise—and what better guarantee of 
that expertise—than proof that there is unmistakably an 
organized body of knowledge, and that the evidence being 
offered is generally accepted within it? 
The problems with the Frye test are serious and do not 
need rehashing here. In essence, they amount to a 
demonstration of the limits and fragility of deference.7 We 
would go further and point out that deference as a mode of 
decision making flies in the face of—indeed is a reproach to—
the deep aspiration of the legal system to obtain rational 
results. If it is truly the case that the fact finder does not 
possess the information necessary to decide a case, then it is 
logical that it also lacks the information necessary to know to 
which of two competing opinions to defer. By embracing a 
deferential model of decision making, the Frye test guarantees 
irrational decision making.8 
  
 4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 5 Id. at 1014 (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in 
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while 
the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made 
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs.”). 
 6 Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the 
Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913, 923 (1998). Milich continues,  
Anything less than complete deference to the weight of credible scientific 
opinion concerning the reliability of scientific evidence means going outside 
science—to the judge or jury . . . to resolve a scientific dispute. The resulting 
judgment cannot be scientific and therefore we cannot honestly speak of the 
evidence as having “scientific” reliability . . . . [T]he “real” issue is whether 
good scientists consider the evidence reliable at this time. 
Id. at 923-24. 
 7 See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of 
Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1141-42 (1993). 
 8 Jurors are left to decide which expert to believe based on the experts’ 
credentials and their credibility—that is, their oratorical performance. 
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The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert 
decision was a commendable effort to reestablish the primacy 
of rationality in decision making.9 Rather than engage in a 
futile and misdirected effort at finding the expert opinion to 
defer to, the Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to require that the trial judge ensure that all 
evidence—not just lay evidence—be both relevant and reliable 
in order to be admissible.10 However, the critical point is that 
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the trial court’s duty 
requires that the trial court not defer to the experts, but 
instead reach a reasoned conclusion about the substance of the 
testimony. In short, the trial court must inform itself about the 
fields pertinent to the testimony. Daubert thus rejects the 
deference model at least so far as the question of admissibility 
is concerned.11 
Unfortunately, once past the admission threshold, 
nothing forbids the presentation of the evidence to the jury in 
the tired, old, radically-subversive-to-the-goals-of-the-legal-
system, deferential fashion. The true problem with Daubert, in 
other words, is that it did not go far enough; although to be fair 
to the Court, it is constrained by the rules as written, which 
plainly permit a deferential presentation of the evidence.12 
Nonetheless, expert testimony could be treated just like any 
other testimony, which means that for it to be admitted, it 
must be understandable by the fact finder. To make an expert’s 
testimony understandable requires not just the judge but also 
the jury to be educated about the relevant matters.13 If parties 
  
 9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 10 Id. at 597 (“‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the 
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of 
Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an 
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. 
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”). 
 11 However, there is some ground for concern about how the trial courts will 
go about their task. See generally Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 
84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157 (1994). 
 12 Rule 704 permits experts to opine on ultimate issues to be decided by the 
trier of fact so long as the opinion does not state that a defendant in a criminal case 
“did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of a crime 
charged or of a defense thereto.” FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
 13 Alvin Goldman uses two very helpful terms to distinguish statements in 
experts’ discourse. Experts’ discourse involves esoteric and exoteric statements. Esoteric 
statements fall within “the relevant sphere of expertise,” but have “truth-values [that] 
are inaccessible” to jurors—“in terms of personal knowledge,” at least. “Exoteric 
statements [fall] outside the domain of expertise” and jurors may understand them. 
Alvin I. Goldman, Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?, 63 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 94 (2001). Statements are exoteric or esoteric relative to an 
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were forced to educate the fact finder about the topics where 
expert opinions are now employed, the problem of expert 
evidence would largely disappear because the process of 
educating the fact finder would likely reveal weaknesses or 
falsities in the evidence. Daubert thus takes a hesitating step 
in the right direction, and those interested in rational decision-
making should encourage extending its application to the trial 
itself.14 Cost is the primary objection to this, but it is 
remarkable that cost is raised as an objection to evidence that 
might actually be useful to a jury—evidence about oncology or 
statistics, for example—where by contrast we force juries to 
absorb vast amounts of information about the private affairs of 
parties that are purely useless to them. 
Notwithstanding the critical epistemological limit of 
Daubert elaborated above, the case has been generally well 
received by the legal system (although not as well received as 
the Federal Rules of Evidence in general).15 In addition to its 
epistemological limitations, other criticisms of it have been 
raised, and the case has prompted at least one major proposal, 
supported by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public 
Policy (“SKAPP”) and a distinguished legal scholar, Professor 
Margaret A. Berger, to change tort law to avoid its effects.16 
  
epistemic standpoint—that is, over time statements that were once esoteric may 
become exoteric. On the education model of expert testimony, the aim is to convert as 
much esoteric evidence as possible to exoteric information. Id. 
 14 The positive effect of Daubert, as well as a symptom of the cost of not 
extending it, is clear in the concern, which is likely true, that judges are making 
sufficiency determinations in Daubert hearings in the guise of admissibility 
determinations. This is a perfectly plausible thing to do if judges think that juries will 
not understand expert evidence. In that case, if the evidence is admissible but not 
sufficient for a verdict, sending it to a jury risks a difficult-to-overturn mistake. 
Screening the evidence for a sufficiently justified opinion to defer to, by contrast, 
advances the goals of the system in this weird setting of irrational decision making. 
 15 As of mid-2003, nine states had adopted the full Daubert trilogy, which 
includes Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and General Electric Co. 
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); seven states had adopted Daubert itself but not the 
other parts of the trilogy; six states had adopted Daubert and Kumho (i.e., the Daubert 
standards apply to a wide range of expert testimony) but had not adopted Joiner (i.e., 
they have rejected the abuse of discretion standard for appellate review); five states 
had explicitly not adopted Daubert but have determined that the Daubert factors can 
be utilized (i.e., they have “endorsed” some of the Daubert principles); fifteen states 
continue to rely on Frye, with the remaining states having their own standards that 
are neither Daubert nor Frye. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert 
Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 351-66 (2004). Similarly, many states 
have closely modeled their rules of evidence after the Federal Rules of Evidence. For a 
list of states adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in various forms, see 6 JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2009). 
 16 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH S59, S65 (2005) (acknowledging the Project on Scientific 
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Collectively, these efforts raise important and timely questions, 
which we address in this article. Although we think the critics 
have highlighted critical issues and provided illuminating 
analysis, we ultimately conclude that, with one notable 
exception, they leave the important—and very difficult—
questions having to do with expert testimony untouched. With 
respect to the notable exception, the policy prescription derived 
from it is, in our opinion, misguided. Nonetheless, their 
proposals help sharpen the intractable problems posed by 
Daubert and the role of expert testimony in the legal system. 
In this paper, we address the various critiques relating 
to Daubert that have been influenced in one manner or another 
by Professor Berger. We begin Part II by addressing what is 
perhaps the central concern with Daubert—that judges are not 
well suited for the gatekeeper function that Daubert bestows 
upon them. These concerns have given rise to a number of 
efforts to either eliminate Daubert or substantially alter the 
judge’s gatekeeper function. More particularly, Part II 
discusses scientific bias and its attendant evidentiary dangers, 
and examines one scholarly proposal for dealing with such bias. 
We argue that those concerns miscalculate the incentives to 
create biased science. In Part III, we evaluate indirect attacks 
on Daubert in the form of proposals for new liability rules that 
eliminate outright the causation requirement in toxic tort 
cases, and thus minimize or eliminate the need for expert 
testimony to support a plaintiff’s case. 
The critiques and responses to Daubert we address are 
individually quite creative. But they are analogous to the 
previous efforts to domesticate the problem of expert 
testimony, of which Daubert itself is an example. Rather than 
dealing directly with the epistemological problem expert 
testimony poses, each of these efforts responds with a new set 
of substantive rules of one sort or another, whether focusing on 
the criteria of admissibility or modifying substantive tort law to 
achieve a purportedly better outcome in the shadow of the 
difficulties of expert testimony. Like previous efforts to deal 
with expert testimony, these proposals will have undesirable 
consequences—often hurting those the proposals are intended 
to help. To us this confirms that the standard of admissibility 
  
Knowledge and Public Policy for its support). Berger is also heavily cited in at least one 
SKAPP manuscript. See PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUB. POLICY, 
DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 
(2003) [hereinafter SKAPP, DAUBERT]. 
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for expert testimony should turn on epistemological concerns 
rather than on political or moral concerns. By ignoring the 
epistemological concerns, these proposals may redistribute 
winners and losers in litigation, but will not advance the 
overall objectives of the legal system.  
Finally, in Part IV, we briefly discuss SKAPP’s study of 
Daubert’s effects in the Delaware courts. That study, though 
not conclusive, suggests that Daubert has not led to the 
nightmare scenarios that many imagined. Indeed, its impact 
has been minimal. After evaluating the proposals for new 
liability rules and discussing the empirical indication that 
Daubert may not have the negative effects that scholars 
imagine, we conclude that the solution to the problem of expert 
testimony lies in making it conform to the normal criteria of 
admissible evidence: that it is capable of being understood by 
the fact finder.  
II. CRITIQUES OF DAUBERT 
A. The Foundational Fear: Biased Judges and Biased Science 
It is obvious and somewhat troubling that attorneys will 
select the most credible expert whose opinions about the 
litigated matter align with the litigants’ objectives. It is less 
obvious but perhaps even more troubling that, as Professor 
Bernstein discusses in a recent article,17 experts will bend, 
consciously and unconsciously, to the objectives of the litigants. 
Conscious bias arises when experts adapt their opinions to the 
needs of the attorney who hires them.18 Unconscious bias is the 
“‘natural bias to do something serviceable for those who employ 
you and adequately remunerate you.’”19 Selection bias means 
  
 17 David Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) 
Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 454-55 (2008). 
 18 Id. Bernstein argues that “hired gun” expert witnesses are widely recognized as 
a serious problem. According to Judge Jack Weinstein, “An expert can be found to testify to 
the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous . . . .” Jack B. Weinstein, 
Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986). Hired guns have, for 
example, been a major problem in asbestosis and silica litigation. See, e.g., In re Silica Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (detailing how experts skewed their 
testimony to benefit plaintiffs); see also David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of 
Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 12 (2003) (discussing plaintiffs’ experts who find 
evidence of injury from asbestos exposure in almost every individual presented to them, 
even when the exposure was extremely limited). 
 19 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 455-56 (quoting Abinger v. Ashton, 17 L.R. Eq. 
358, 374 (Ch. 1873)). 
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that experts selected for trial will be chosen to “represent the 
perspective the attorney wants to present at trial.”20 
Given these potential biases, Judge Alex Kozinski may 
have gotten it right in the remand of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,21 when he warned that science done for 
the purpose of litigation is more prone to bias.22 Judge Kozinski 
expressed concerns that scientists retained for trial would 
deviate from the norm of disinterested inquiry. This 
disinterested inquiry is what makes scientific evidence so 
valuable in courtrooms: “[T]estimony proffered by an expert . . . 
based directly on legitimate, preexisting research unrelated to 
the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for concluding 
that the opinions [a scientist] expresses were ‘derived by the 
scientific method.’”23 The concern, expressed in a roundabout 
way, is that scientists conducting litigation-driven science are 
more likely to succumb to biases, leading them to commit fraud 
or to fudge the data. In other words, “when an expert prepares 
reports and findings before being hired as a witness, that 
record will limit the degree to which he can tailor his testimony 
to serve a party’s interests.”24 Judge Kozinski’s central concern, 
to borrow a helpful dichotomy from Professor Susan Haack, is 
that scientists retained for litigation will focus on advocacy 
rather than disinterested inquiry.25 
  
 20 Id. at 456. Given the deference model of expert testimony encouraged by 
Daubert and judges, it is quite likely that selection bias means that attorneys shop for 
experts who will not only testify favorably, but will do so with a convincing demeanor. 
See id. at 456-57. The epistemic opacity of expert testimony on the deference model 
means that jurors frequently must judge expert witnesses not on their substantive 
testimony, but on their demeanor and credentials. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 13, at 
96 n.13, 97. One of the sources of evidence that non-experts may draw on to judge 
between competing experts is the formal credentials earned by the experts. See Scott 
Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 
1538 (1998). Of the array of reasoning mechanisms available to non-experts to choose 
among expert witnesses, the two most likely to be relied on are (1) “the expert’s 
demeanor, either as he appears before the non-expert in person or as indicated by . . . 
the tone and authoritative style of written submissions to the court,” and (2) the 
expert’s credentials. Id. at 1616. 
 21 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 22 Id. at 1317. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in 
Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1070 (2008) (“Inquiry, 
investigation—the professional business of scientists, historians, legal and literary 
scholars, investigative journalists, and so forth—is a matter of trying to discover the 
answer to some question: who committed the crime, what caused the cancer or made it 
advance so quickly, where did the money go, etc.? Advocacy, by contrast—the 
professional business of lobbyists, attorneys, and so on—is a matter of trying to 
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Although much has been made of Kozinski’s concerns 
about litigation-driven science, our own brief and informal 
survey revealed that judges who invoke this concern do so only 
when scientific evidence fails to meet most or all of the other 
Daubert factors.26 Indeed, it appears that judges only invoke the 
litigation-driven nature of scientific work where none of the 
Daubert factors is satisfied—that is, the expert’s study has not 
been peer reviewed, has no error rate, has no general 
acceptance, and so forth—and then the judges only invoke it in 
a boilerplate fashion.27 In effect, Judge Kozinski’s additional 
Daubert factor is used as something of a pejorative term to 
describe evidence that has met none of the Daubert factors. 
And we think this is perfectly appropriate. 
1. Proposed Liberalized Standards  
In a recent SKAPP-sponsored article, Leslie I. Boden 
and David Ozonoff argue convincingly that there is good reason 
to be concerned about litigation-driven science conducted by 
defendants prior to—and in expectation of—a lawsuit.28 This is 
because certain corporations always act with an eye to 
  
persuade an audience of the truth of some proposition: that my client didn’t do it, that 
it was work-related PCB exposure that promoted the tumor, that the stolen money has 
been hidden in a numbered account in the Cayman Islands, etc.”). 
 26 These cases are anecdotally interesting, as the list is nowhere near 
comprehensive. In Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 209, 214 (D. Nev. 1996), the 
court mentions the litigation-driven nature of a doctor’s work, but then bars the 
evidence based on the damning fact that the doctor never examined the plaintiff’s brain 
shunt, had no literature to support his claims, and was arguing claims that are neither 
supported in the scientific community nor subjected to peer review. In Awad v. Merck 
& Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court ultimately permitted 
testimony despite the fact that “[the expert’s] opinion rests primarily on articles 
written by others, which he analyzed only because of this case . . . . [T]he theory on 
which he bases his conclusions—that the RA 27/3 vaccine causes chronic joint 
problems—has been subjected to peer review, and its degree of acceptance in the 
scientific community can be examined.” In Cerna v. South Florida Bioavailability 
Clinic, 815 So. 2d 652, 654-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the court noted that the 
expert’s testimony was prepared specifically for trial, but rejected it after a lengthy 
analysis because “his methodologies are not generally accepted in the scientific 
community.” In Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 433, 435-36 
(6th Cir. 2007), the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant because the 
plaintiff’s expert had not tested his hypothesis (which itself did not enjoy general 
acceptance during the relevant time period) and because the “‘quintessential expert for 
hire’” did not show “some objective proof—such as the expert’s extensive familiarity 
with the particular type of machine in question . . . —supporting the reliability of the 
expert’s testimony.”  
 27 It bears mentioning that such evidence would likely be inadmissible even 
absent Judge Kozinski’s Daubert factor. 
 28 Leslie I. Boden & David Ozonoff, Litigation-Generated Science: Why 
Should We Care?, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117 (2008). 
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litigation.29 Accordingly, Boden and Ozonoff argue, there is no 
reason to think that litigation-generated science (“LGS1”) is 
any less reliable than science generated in expectation of 
litigation (“LGS2”).30 Thus, Kozinski’s concern about bias was 
correct, but it did not go far enough. Boden and Ozonoff suggest 
liberalizing the standards for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, relying on cross-examination to winnow out the 
unreliable science.31 
There are, to be sure, powerful incentives in place for 
biased science.32 LGS1, which plaintiffs frequently rely upon to 
prove causation in toxic tort cases, potentially creates in the 
scientist “a financial conflict of interest.”33 The concern is that 
the conflict of interest “will lead the researcher to conduct the 
study or interpret the results in a manner designed to suit that 
party,”34 but there are equally strong financial and social 
incentives for scientists to fudge LGS2.35 The ability to 
influence scientific experiments allows corporations to use 
biased LGS2 to satisfy the safety concerns of purchasers, and it 
proves useful if the product’s safety should be litigated.36 Boden 
and Ozonoff assert that a cluster of studies show “a covert 
litigation-driven relationship between LGS2 and the general 
literature that is currently less likely to be subjected to the 
same additional scrutiny routinely applied to science that is 
  
 29 Id. at 118. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 119. 
 32 The pressure on corporate scientists is immense:  
Approval of new drugs can literally add billions of dollars to annual profits. 
To obtain approval, companies must demonstrate safety and efficacy. Failure 
to show either can lead the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
delay or ultimately deny approval. Thus, the companies funding drug trials 
obviously need and want results that support their applications. This 
research is begun well in advance of any possible liability litigation and not 
explicitly to support a position in a lawsuit. But such research purporting to 
demonstrate safety could be used later by companies defending 
themselves . . . . Scientists and companies are aware of this aspect of safety 
research conducted before a product hits the market. 
Id. at 118. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. One study, for instance, shows that “safety and efficacy studies funded 
by pharmaceutical companies” tend to exhibit “conclusions more favorable to the 
companies funding them.” Id. Another study shows that “biomedical industry 
relationships are associated with a delay in reporting research results.” Id. (citation 
omitted). The authors argue that such delays violate scientific norms when they are 
caused by trade secret concerns. Id.  
 36 Id.  
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explicitly case specific.”37 Because plaintiffs do not have the 
same ability to generate LGS2 as potential defendants, the 
authors argue that judges, like Kozinski, who treat LGS1 as 
much more suspect than LGS2, effectively “place[][their] 
thumb[s] on the scales of justice.”38 
Unlike some of the other critiques of Daubert that 
endorse eliminating judges’ gatekeeper function outright, Boden 
and Ozonoff endorse substantially lowering the gate of 
admissibility. Specifically, they endorse “expanded discovery and 
greater latitude for cross-examination by the parties. . . . 
[p]articularly . . . where company motives that appear unrelated 
to the case at hand may be highly pertinent.”39 They buttress 
their arguments for expanded discovery by arguing that peer 
review is overrated and that cross-examination in many cases 
will do at least as good a job as peer review of winnowing out 
bad science.40 
Boden and Ozonoff disagree with recent work that has 
taken a more hopeful view of peer review’s potential to winnow 
scientific wheat from chaff.41 Peer review, they argue, is not the 
remedy for Judge Kozinski’s concerns, and even if it were, peer 
review may take too long to meet the demands of litigation.42 
Moreover, the questions central to a legal case may be too 
narrow for peer-review publication, and the methodologies 
utilized in LGS1 may be too cutting edge to satisfy the “inside 
the box” thinking that peer review rewards.43 Daubert, the 
  
 37 Id. at 119. 
 38 Id.  
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. at 119-20. They cite research showing that peer reviewers frequently 
disagree about whether to support papers. Id. at 119 (citing Peter M. Rothwell & 
Christopher N. Martyn, Reproducibility of Peer Review in Clinical Neuroscience: Is 
Agreement Between Reviewers any Greater than Would Be Expected by Chance Alone?, 
123 BRAIN 1964 (2000)). They also show evidence that “poorly designed and analyzed 
studies can easily receive favorable reviews.” Id. (citing Gregory D. Curfman, Stephen 
Morrissey & Jeffrey M. Drazen, Expression of Concern Reaffirmed, 354 NEW ENGL. J. 
MED. 1193 (2006); Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of 
Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 178 (2006)). Additionally, they argue 
that published articles receive “only the most cursory peer review.” Id. at 119-20 (citing 
S. Jasanoff, Representation and Re-representation in Litigation Science, 116 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 123 (2008)). “[S]cientists opt for study designs, do analyses, and 
interpret results in ways that bias conclusions one way or another . . . . Peer review . . . 
is unlikely to detect any but the most blatant fraud or scientific misconduct.” Id. at 120. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. As examples of “outside of the box” thinking, the authors cite articles in 
economics that had great difficulty in getting published but that eventually were awarded 
the Nobel Prize. See, e.g., Joshua S. Gans & George B. Shepherd, How Are the Mighty 
Fallen: Rejected Classic Articles by Leading Economists, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 165 (1994). 
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authors point out, recognizes these problems: “‘[I]n some 
instances, well-grounded but innovative theories will not have 
been published . . . . Some propositions, moreover, are too 
particular, too new or of too limited interest to be published.’”44 
The protections of peer review, they argue, can “‘fall apart if 
lawyers and litigation experts invade the realm of scientific 
research and manipulate the medical and scientific publication 
system to achieve their litigation ends.’”45 
Boden and Ozonoff believe that jurors should get to 
decide what kind of science is unreliable by letting all evidence 
in and letting the process of cross-examination reveal which 
science is unworthy. Cross-examination, in the authors’ view, is 
more stringent than almost all peer review processes because 
lawyers, unlike peer reviewers, are properly incentivized to get 
to the truth; therefore, cross-examination may actually be more 
useful than peer review for uncovering flawed or biased 
research.46 Lawyers preparing for cross-examination are 
typically aided by consultants and go over the studies in 
exacting detail, which could potentially bring to light any flaws 
in a particular study. Cross-examination’s adversarial nature 
thus offers the potential of revealing errors that peer review 
would not detect.47 They conclude that there are no strong 
reasons to treat the conflicts of interest that LGS1 creates any 
differently from the conflicts of interest that LGS2 creates: 
“Drawing a bright line at the moment litigation begins may be 
  
 44 Boden & Ozonoff, supra note 28, at 120 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)). 
 45 Id. at 120 (quoting William L. Anderson, Barry M. Parsons & Drummond 
Rennie, Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
619 (2001)). 
 46 Id. Boden and Ozonoff suggest a greater degree of disclosure by scientists 
as required by the manuscript requirements of the International Committee for 
Medical Journal Editors: 
Authors submitting articles to [medical] journals must disclose all 
relationships that might involve the appearance of a conflict of interest, and 
they must disclose study funding . . . . Articles submitted to the journals 
should be accompanied by signed statements by authors stating that they 
control the data, analysis, the writing of reports, and submission for 
publication. Authors must describe any involvement of sponsors in any of 
these aspects of the study.  
Id. at 121. It seems like these questions would be answered right away on cross-
examination. However, disclosure is not a panacea, the authors argue, as “[s]ponsors 
with control over publication can decide which studies to submit, possibly choosing 
preferentially to submit favorable studies and thus biasing the overall literature on 
safety or efficacy.” Id. (citations omitted).  
 47 Id. at 120. 
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convenient for the court, but it does not serve the interests of 
justice.”48 
Boden and Ozonoff’s prescription to lower standards of 
admissibility for scientific evidence is premised on the 
conventional notion that errors at trial should be distributed 
fairly, as well as the assumption that a fair distribution of 
errors is not possible if defendants are allowed to introduce 
more biased science than plaintiffs. The authors propose to 
solve this potential inequality by allowing judges to admit more 
of plaintiffs’ error-inducing biased science into the courtroom, 
thus ensuring a parity of errors. 
We have elaborated on Boden and Ozonoff’s arguments 
about pre-litigation science because we think there is a critical 
element of truth in the assertion that LGS2 is susceptible to 
the same sorts of conflicts of interest and biases as LGS1. 
Thus, it is by no means impossible that the Kozinski position 
biases the trial process unfairly against plaintiffs, and that as a 
result, errors at trial may be inappropriately skewed against 
plaintiffs. Curiously, however, the authors neglect the point 
that defendants also commission LGS1 and that plaintiffs also 
commission LGS2.49 Boden and Ozonoff’s failure to account for 
these realities, particularly the latter, diminishes the force of 
their arguments. Recent events demonstrate that our concerns 
about Boden and Ozonoff’s oversights are more than merely 
hypothetical.  
2. The Problem with Relaxed Standards: The MMR 
Vaccine Example 
The link between the measles, mumps, and rubella 
(“MMR”) vaccination and autism has been a major source of 
concern for years now. The concern was that trace amounts of 
mercury in childhood vaccines were causing autism in very 
young children. Consequently, many children were not given 
life-saving vaccines due to parental omission bias,50 and the 
  
 48 Id. at 121. 
 49 Indeed, the point is neglected that massive errors against defendants are 
also made by the system. Interestingly, SKAPP’s very existence is a consequence of one 
of those errors. SKAPP is funded by the Silicone Implants Products Liability Litigation 
which was, by most lights, wrongly decided for the plaintiffs. See, e.g., David E. 
Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457 (1999) (reviewing MARCIA 
ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE 
BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996)). 
 50 “[O]mission bias is manifested when a more harmful act of omission is 
preferred to a less harmful act of commission.” Hal Arkes, The Psychology of Patient 
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“failure to vaccinate . . . caused many preventable deaths and 
avoidable hospitalizations from measles, whooping cough, 
diphtheria, flu, hepatitis and meningitis.”51 In a pattern 
evincing the Benedictin scare leading to the Daubert lawsuit,52 
public concern about the autism link led to the vaccine 
thimerosal being pulled off the market, and the initiation of 
more than 4800 lawsuits.53 Despite reports by pediatricians 
that vaccines did not cause autism, and support from American 
pediatricians for the World Health Organization’s decision to 
continue vaccinating children with thimerosal, the scare 
campaign carried out in the media was thoroughgoing and, 
evidently, good for ratings, as there was even a fictional 
television program about a law suit against a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer that created a substance similar to thimerosal.54 
Much of the vaccine scare can be traced back to a 1998 
study by the English doctor Andrew Wakefield. In his study, 
published in the prestigious Lancet medical journal, Dr. 
Wakefield reported that eight out of twelve families in his 
clinic who had given the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine 
to their children began to see signs of autism within just days 
of their children receiving the jab.55 Dr. Wakefield’s report led 
to a staggering decrease in vaccinations in England, with rates 
of inoculation falling from 92% to below 80%.56 At the time of 
this writing, there are 1348 cases of measles in England and 
Wales, compared to 56 in 1998.57 Two children have died of the 
  
Decision Making: The Omission Bias, in INTERACTIVE TEXTBOOK ON CLINICAL SYMPTOM 
RESEARCH, http://symptomresearch.nih.gov/chapter_4/sec2/chas2pg1.htm (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2010). 
 51 Caplan on Vaccines and Autism, THE EDITORS’ BLOG, AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 
(Feb. 6, 2007), http://blog.bioethics.net/2007/02/caplan-on-vaccines-and-autism.html. 
 52 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 53 Ed Silverman, Long Shot? Autism and Vaccines Trial Begins, PHARMALOT 
(May 12, 2008, 9:11 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2008/05/long-shot-autism-and-
vaccines-trial-begins. 
 54 Molly McDonough, Pediatric Group Releases Mercury-Autism Study, 
Condemns New Lawyer Drama, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2008, 7:15 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/pediatric_group_releases_mercury_autism_study_condem
ns_new_lawyer_drama/. 
 55 Andrew Deer, MMR Doctor Andrew Wakefield Fixed Data on Autism, 
SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 8, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/ 
article5683671.ece. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. 
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disease.58 It has since become clear that Wakefield drastically 
misreported the results of his study:59 
The patients who were “enrolled” in his study were actually not just 
random children who appeared on the doorstep of Royal Free 
Hospital but were clients of an attorney working against a vaccine 
company alleging that vaccines caused autism. Most already know 
that the children already had autism when they came into the study, 
but what was news to me at least was that Wakefield had received 
55,000 pounds from something called Britain’s Legal Aid Board in 
the previous year (big money if you are a graduate student) which 
supported research related to lawsuits.60 
Tellingly, the Lancet recently retracted Dr. Wakefield’s 
article.61 The General Medical Council ruled that Dr. Wakefield 
evinced a “callous disregard” for children’s welfare and abused 
his station.62 
Boden and Ozonoff’s concerns about incentives to fudge 
science are well-founded and worthy of consideration. But their 
proposal for relaxed standards of admissibility does not account 
for the possibility that biased science is conducted on behalf of 
potential plaintiffs, as the Wakefield example demonstrates. If 
both defendants and plaintiffs have powerful incentives to 
manipulate scientific research, relaxing the standards of 
admissibility will not level the playing field, as Boden and 
Ozonoff hope; it will only increase the risk of errors. 
Given the attendant dangers of errors in juridical 
decision making based on false or misleading scientific 
  
 58 Id. 
 59 The Sunday Times investigation in coordination with the General Medical 
Council (GMC): 
reveal[ed] that: In most of the 12 cases, the children’s ailments as described 
in The Lancet were different from their hospital and GP records. Although 
the research paper claimed that problems came on within days of the jab, in 
only one case did medical records suggest this was true, and in many of the 
cases medical concerns had been raised before the children were vaccinated. 
Hospital pathologists, looking for inflammatory bowel disease, reported in the 
majority of cases that the gut was normal. This was then reviewed and the 
Lancet paper showed them as abnormal.  
Id.  
 60 Summer Johnson, The Wakefield Scandal Thickens…, BIOETHICS BLOG (Feb. 
23, 2009), http://blog.bioethics.net/2009/02/the-wakefield-scandal-thickens. 
 61 Madison Park, Medical Journal Retracts Study Linking Autism to Vaccine, 
CNN HEALTH (Feb. 2, 2010, 1:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/02/lancet. 
retraction.autism/index.html?hpt=T2. 
 62 Thomas Moore, MMR Row Doctor Hits Back at Conduct Claims, SKY NEWS 
ONLINE (Jan. 28, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://news.sky.com/skynews/ (search “MMR Row 
Doctor Hits Back at Conduct Claims”; then follow hyperlink to article). 
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evidence, and the capacity of both sides to litigation to produce 
it, Boden and Ozonoff’s suggestion for even laxer standards of 
admissibility is misguided. Ensuring a parity of errors, as the 
authors suggest, might provide fairness, but will certainly come 
at the cost of accuracy in fact finding. The suggestion is both 
unacceptable and unnecessary. It is unacceptable given the 
Supreme Court’s supposition that “[t]he basic purpose of a trial 
is the determination of truth.”63 It is unnecessary because the 
solution to the problems of endemic bias in LGS1 and LGS2 is 
not to sacrifice accuracy to attain fairness, but to attain 
fairness by increasing accuracy. Potentially error-inducing 
variables in all scientific enterprises should be examined fully 
by the trial judges, and research efforts that do not measure up 
should be excluded whenever they are brought to light. This is 
not a radical idea at all—it is what Daubert demands. 
The genius of Daubert is that it commands that the trial 
judge take all possibilities of bias into account. Of course, if 
research generated in litigation turns out to be more 
systematically biased than other forms, then it should follow, 
and should follow uncontroversially, that such research should 
also be more frequently excluded. Boden and Ozonoff have 
provided an admirable service by highlighting the potential 
biasing pressures in LGS2, but what follows from this is that 
all scientific expert testimony should run the same gamut of 
admissibility, not that errors at trial should be proliferated out 
of a misguided sense of fairness.64 
B. Bias in Action: The Unfair and Unconstitutional 
Application of Daubert 
SKAPP and those associated with it criticize Daubert 
from a number of other angles and call for a variety of reforms. 
SKAPP argues that Daubert may violate the Seventh 
Amendment, or at least should be construed to do so, and that 
judges routinely misinterpret scientific evidence in pretrial 
Daubert hearings in ways that are consistently harmful to 
  
 63 Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
 64 In a system without transaction costs, a policy of letting all evidence in 
that the parties wished to adduce might be sensible. Patient exploration of “junk” 
produced by the other side would expose it for what it is. Things change in a system 
with transaction costs, especially, as in the United States, where the parties do not 
bear the true cost of their activities. In that system, an exclusionary approach may 
achieve better overall outcomes. 
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plaintiffs in toxic tort cases.65 An important example is the 
exclusion of “mosaic evidence,” which entails relying on shards 
of otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to create a picture 
of causation.66 
SKAPP grounds its arguments against Daubert in the 
Seventh Amendment, which it interprets as imparting a right 
for a plaintiff to tell his or her story in court, regardless of the 
evidentiary merit.67 According to this view, Daubert hearings 
raise serious constitutional issues by denying plaintiffs that 
right.68 According to Professor Berger, the Seventh Amendment, 
which assures the right to a jury trial,69 “‘could be read as not 
just entitling a litigant to a jury verdict, but more broadly to a 
jury trial when experts in different disciplines disagree.’”70 
Professor Berger argues that point: 
Even if a plaintiff’s verdict were ultimately set aside as not based on 
sufficient evidence of causation, a public trial means the plaintiff 
gets to tell his or her story and it also means that wrongdoing on the 
part of defendants can be exposed. Even when causation cannot be 
proved, that does not necessarily mean that defendants did not act in 
a reprehensible manner in exposing the public to risk. For example, 
problems often develop with drugs long after they have been 
approved for market. Jury trials could reveal whether corporations 
knowingly kept drugs or products on the market after it became 
clear that problems existed. If such a case ends with a Daubert 
hearing, none of this will ever become public.71 
The difficulty here is obvious. The Seventh Amendment 
has never been construed as containing the right to use trials 
as a form of investigative reporting independent of the validity 
of the underlying legal claims.72 Professor Berger does not 
seriously argue to the contrary. Rather, she argues that it 
should be so construed, but in doing so neglects the proposal’s 
problems of costs and increased chance of erroneous (and 
  
 65 SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 7-8. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Id. at 8. 
 68 Id. 
 69 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
 70 SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 8 (citing Interview by SKAPP with 
Margaret Berger, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (May 15-June 6, 2003)). 
 71 Id. 
 72 As an initial matter, the Seventh Amendment has not been held 
“incorporated” in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Thus, the 
Constitution does not assure a right to jury trial in state court proceedings. 
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 
92 U.S. 90 (1875). 
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difficult to rectify) verdicts. Moreover, it is entirely unclear 
what benefit might result. If “corporations”—it is unclear to us 
why corporations are the focus, but we adopt her focus for the 
discussion herein—behaved “reprehensibl[y]” and “knowingly 
kept drugs and products on the market after it became clear 
that problems existed,” it is difficult to imagine why there 
would not be a plethora of deserving plaintiffs willing to let the 
plaintiffs’ bar bring a cause of action.73 
A more troubling concern that SKAPP raises has to do 
with the frequency with which judges bar “mosaic evidence.” 
Mosaic evidence is, as the name suggests, a composite 
evidentiary image made up of shards of evidence “from sources 
that are frequently excluded when used to prove causation—
such as anecdotal evidence, animal studies, chemical structure 
analysis, in vitro studies, and preliminary epidemiological 
studies.”74 SKAPP argues that the cumulative impact of mosaic 
evidence is ignored by judges who weigh each piece of evidence 
individually.75 SKAPP argues that by barring mosaic evidence, 
judges bar evidence that is commonly relied on in the scientific 
community.  
But the criticism misses the significance of the differing 
institutional context. In the scientific community, mosaic 
evidence is used as a brake against introducing potentially 
harmful products into the public, whereas in the legal context 
it is used as an engine of liability. So, for instance, it may take 
only the slightest hint that something is harmful for it not to be 
introduced into the public, but liability for products that have 
been approved by the FDA and undergone thorough testing 
should require more than a slight hint of risk. 
The Bendectin case is a good example. As Professor 
Berger and products liability scholar Aaron Twerski tell it, 
there were many such hints of risk at the time of litigation, but 
it is now generally accepted that those slight hints were 
statistical aberrations or the results of poorly conducted 
studies.76 Bendectin is still prescribed in many places in the 
world, including Europe, is endorsed by the World Health 
Organization as safe, and has been vindicated by meta-
  
 73 SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 8. 
 74 David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons from “An American 
Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1961, 1971-72 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
 75 SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 8. 
 76 Bernstein, supra note 74, at 1964-67. 
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analyses and the support of a number of epidemiological 
studies.77 Given the weight of evidence in favor of Bendectin’s 
safety, it seems peculiar to argue for mosaic evidence from a 
case in which it would have plainly been misleading. 
The final SKAPP critique we address concerns the 
chilling effects of Daubert on plaintiffs. The costs of Daubert 
hearings, SKAPP argues, chill plaintiffs from bringing suits 
because jury awards often barely cover the costs of Daubert 
hearings.78 This argument overestimates the frequency of 
Daubert hearings79 and miscalculates their costs. The 
miscalculation is because SKAPP considers only the chilling 
effect of Daubert hearings on plaintiffs, and ignores the effect of 
high costs on defendants.80 Costly Daubert hearings may deter 
plaintiffs from bringing suit, but they also provide a powerful 
incentive for defendants to settle. 
III. CAUSATION-FREE THEORIES OF TORT 
We now turn directly to the work of Professor Margaret 
A. Berger, a distinguished evidence scholar who has made 
many significant contributions to the field of evidence, 
particularly scientific evidence.81 For a little over a decade, 
Professor Berger has argued for eliminating the causation 
  
 77 See, e.g., P.M. McKeigue et al., Bendectin and Birth Defects: A Meta-Analysis 
of the Epidemiologic Studies, 50 TERATOLOGY 27 (1994); Bruce Jancin, Do-It-Yourself 
Bendectin Advocated for Nausea, OB/GYN NEWS (Oct. 1, 2002), http://findarticles. 
com/p/articles/mi_m0CYD/is_19_37/ai_92938826 (“Thirty epidemiologic studies have 
concluded that Bendectin was safe for use in pregnancy[.] The FDA, World Health 
Organization, and March of Dimes have exonerated the drug. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention hasn’t found any reduction in birth defects nationally since 
Bendectin was pulled from the market.”). 
 78 SKAPP, DAUBERT, supra note 16, at 12.  
 79 See NICOLE L. WATERS & JESSICA P. HODGE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, THE EFFECTS OF THE DAUBERT TRILOGY IN DELAWARE SUPERIOR COURT 21 
(2005) (finding that in Delaware Daubert hearings were isolated to a small number of 
important and complex cases). 
 80 Defendants too must retain experts to testify at Daubert hearings. 
Defendants must also contribute to costs associated with the hearing. See, e.g., Thomas 
G. Gutheil & Harold J. Bursztajn, Attorney Abuses of Daubert Hearings: Junk Science, 
Junk Law, or Just Plain Obstruction?, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 150, 152 (2005). 
 81 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of 
Science and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997); Margaret A. Berger, Procedural 
Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994); Margaret A. 
Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 245 
(1986); Margaret A. Berger, Introduction, Science for Judges, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2003); 
Margaret A. Berger, Introduction, Science for Judges II, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485 (2004); 
Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting The Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of 
The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2001). 
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requirement in toxic torts contexts, which would in turn largely 
eliminate the debate over scientific evidence in a large run of 
tort cases by making such evidence unnecessary for a plaintiff’s 
case. This would accomplish indirectly what the direct attacks 
on limited admissibility of scientific evidence attempt to 
achieve. We address her individual efforts and trace their 
evolution in her collaborative work with products liability 
scholar Aaron D. Twerski.  
A. Professor Berger’s Causation-Free Theory 
Professor Berger proposes a new theory of toxic torts 
that she rightly calls “a new theory of justice.”82 Professor 
Berger hopes to prevent immoral corporate behavior by 
imposing liability on corporations that fail “to develop and 
disclose information that is needed to assess serious latent 
risk[]” in toxic substances.83 To accomplish this end, Berger 
proposes shifting the burden of persuasion on the issue of 
causation such that defendants in toxic tort cases must prove 
that they did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.84 Under this 
theory, a plaintiff need only show that the defendant 
corporation failed to keep itself “reasonably informed about the 
risks of its products.”85 Successful plaintiffs under Berger’s 
theory may receive only a fraction of compensatory damages 
(possibly through an administrative compensation fund) 
because they have not borne the burden of proving the 
defendant caused their physical injury.86 The damage award is 
largely punitive in nature, ignoring as it does causation, and 
focusing instead on wrongdoing. 
  
 82 Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New 
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2117 (1997). 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. at 2144-45. Similarly, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the 
drug was only partly responsible for the plaintiff’s injury, thereby mitigating damages. Id.  
 85 Id. at 2134. 
 86 Id. (“Regardless of whether an administrative compensation scheme is in 
effect, plaintiffs might not be entitled to a full measure of traditional damages under 
this new tort. In exchange for relieving plaintiffs of having to prove general causation, 
a possible fair trade-off might be to release defendants from having to pay for plaintiffs’ 
pain and suffering, or to provide for some form of damage scheduling. This is one of the 
many difficult issues that courts would have to resolve. Punitive damages should not 
be available as they already have been factored into the recovery—liability has been 
imposed because of defendants’ egregious indifference to ascertaining risk, a 
component that under traditional tort theory does not support liability in the absence 
of causation.”).  
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Berger’s theory was born of a concern that, in a post-
Daubert world, plaintiffs frequently cannot prove causation due 
to scientific uncertainty about the dangers of a particular 
substance.87 In toxic tort cases, “[t]he causation model is blind 
to the realities of scientific uncertainty.”88 Injured plaintiffs are 
losing cases they should win, Professor Berger argues, because 
of the difficulties that attend proving causation under 
Daubert.89 Scientific uncertainty allows unscrupulous 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to keep potentially unsafe 
drugs on the market. Professor Berger’s charge is that 
manufacturers not only predict when they will be able to avoid 
liability despite having inadequately researched and disclosed 
the long term risks of their chemicals, but also use these 
predictions to market unsafe drugs.90 
Professor Berger was not being immodest when she 
referred to her theory as a new theory of justice: a causation-
free tort that places the burden of proving noncausation on the 
defendant and awards injured plaintiffs a portion of 
compensatory damages through an administrative fund is 
substantively, structurally, and procedurally a significant 
departure from current tort practice. This novel theory arose 
out of two concerns. First, Professor Berger argues that tort 
law’s causation requirement inadequately incentivizes 
responsible corporate behavior.91 Berger’s second concern is 
that the causation model is inconsistent with the “corrective 
justice rationale that liability is linked to moral 
responsibility.”92 This is because “causation is often fortuitous 
and thus morally arbitrary. To erect sharp disparities of 
treatment on such a foundation violates the requirement of 
equal treatment implied by the conception of equal dignity and 
respect.”93 
  
 87 Id. at 2123. 
 88 Id. at 2117. 
 89 See id. at 2130-34. 
 90 Id. at 2136-40. 
 91 Id. at 2119. 
 92 Id. (“[E]liminating causation furthers tort law’s corrective justice rationale 
that liability is linked to moral responsibility.”). Professor Berger argues that certain 
features of toxic tort cases “mesh poorly with the corrective justice notion that 
individuals should be liable only for morally irresponsible choices.” Id. at 2133. 
 93 Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation and Moral Responsibility, 
in PHILISOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 347, 349 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
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Professor Berger’s proposal invites appraisal at both the 
philosophical and practical levels. We begin with the 
philosophical. 
1. Philosophical Difficulties 
Professor Berger justifies her theory in part on 
corrective justice grounds.94 Specifically, she relies on the work 
of Christopher Schroeder, who argues that corrective justice 
demands the abandonment of tort law’s cause-in-fact 
requirement because it is “too slender a reed” upon which to 
rest liability.95 Schroeder’s theory of corrective justice, which 
predicates liability on moral responsibility, is not well accepted 
among tort theorists.96 But even Schroeder agrees that theories 
of corrective justice must adhere to certain foundational 
principles,97 one of which is the Kantian requirement that 
corrective justice “defend[] liability on noninstrumental 
grounds, freed from consideration of purposes external to the 
tort process, such as distributive justice.”98 Berger’s theory 
violates this requirement by justifying liability on instrumental 
grounds, as it aims to incentivize corporations to “obtain[] 
  
 94 Berger, supra note 82, at 2119. (“[E]liminating causation furthers tort 
law’s corrective justice rationale that liability is linked to moral responsibility.”). 
 95 Schroeder, supra note 93, at 361; see also, Christopher H. Schroeder, 
Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1990). 
“[C]orrective justice does not require liabilities in tort to be based on cause-in-fact.” Id. 
at 144. Schroeder advocates a conception of corrective justice that holds “actors . . . 
liable for the risks they create,” rather than the risks they create that result in harm. 
Id. Indeed, Schroeder advocates a “liability-for-risk system” rather than “harm-caused 
system.” Id. 
 96 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of Tort Law, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/#CorJus (“For a loss to be wrongful in the relevant 
sense, it need not be one for which the wrongdoer is morally to blame.”). Schroeder 
maintains that his is a theory of corrective justice because corrective justice “is itself a 
contested concept, loose enough to invite continual debate . . . and comprehended 
enough to produce some shared agreement.” Schroeder, supra note 95, at 146. 
 97 Schroeder, supra note 93, at 360. 
 98 Schroeder, supra note 95, at 147 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For 
Schroeder, who grounds his theory of corrective justice in Kantian moral philosophy, the 
noninstrumental requirement flows from the central tenet of Kantian moral philosophy, 
which is to “[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a 
means to an end.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett 3d ed. 1993) (1785); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 633 (2002) (“So far as private 
law is concerned, Kant traces the conceptual development of right from the notion that 
one is not to allow oneself to be a mere means for others . . . .”). Any instrumentalist 
justification for the theory would then undercut its Kantian foundations. 
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earlier and better information . . . about potential problems.”99 
Hence, corrective justice provides no justificatory cover for 
Berger’s causation-free theory of torts. Accordingly, Berger’s 
theory must be evaluated on instrumental grounds; that is, the 
value of her theory depends entirely on the consequences of its 
implementation. We turn to those next.  
2. The Unforeseen and Undesirable Consequences of 
Berger’s Theory 
Professor Berger’s theory promises to make defendants 
behave differently by increasing the costs for any risky 
behavior and vindicating plaintiffs who would otherwise lose 
due to scientific uncertainty. It is a safe bet that both of these 
aims will be fulfilled under her theory. In this sense, her theory 
might be said to give rise to consequences that might be viewed 
as beneficial. But there are a whole host of additional 
consequences to consider—particularly aggregate costs—that 
Professor Berger does not address. 
Consider the problem of setting highway speed limits: 
speeding-related traffic deaths would certainly be reduced if 
visually and emotionally arresting accidents were used as the 
basis for lowering highway speed limits by forty miles per 
hour.100 But such a solution entails many other human costs.101 
The cost of goods would increase as commerce slowed, the 
economy would suffer as people spent otherwise productive 
time in transit. People might very well quit using highways for 
their high speed driving, instead choosing to drive faster in 
residential areas and other areas less suited for high speed 
driving, in turn causing even more fatal accidents and perhaps 
even raising the costs of traffic enforcement. By seeking to 
prevent all accidents, we may indirectly cause many more. All 
costs must be considered when writing regulations that effect 
human safety. 
In appraising these costs, we begin with a previously 
unnoticed but significant consequence of Berger’s theory. By 
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, Berger’s theory 
  
 99 Berger, supra note 82, at 2141. 
 100 Though it may be difficult to admit, we tacitly agree to sacrifice thousands of 
human lives a year in exchange for the benefits that flow from current highway speeds. 
 101 For general discussions of the unavoidable tradeoffs of governing, see 
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 73 
(2008); Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 628 (2005).  
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eliminates plaintiffs’ lawyers’ gatekeeper function, thereby 
altering the litigation calculus. Plaintiffs’ lawyers (and often 
their expert witnesses) play a gatekeeper function of their own, 
weighing the costs of litigation against the potential 
contingency fee discounted by the probability of success. It has 
been argued that Daubert drove the costs of litigation up for 
plaintiffs, thereby dissuading some plaintiffs from litigating, 
and it is certainly true that the cost of litigation affects 
plaintiffs’ incentive to bring suit and defendants’ incentive to 
settle. Berger’s proposed theory of liability will drive the costs 
of litigation down for plaintiffs, and it will make the costs for 
defendants disproportionately higher. Placing the burden of 
causation on the defendants concomitantly removes the burden 
of proving causation from the plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs’ costs 
go down and defendants’ costs go up, litigation is likely to 
increase as the incentives to settle increase.102 In essence, the 
burden of proving the absence of causation will fall on 
defendants to show that every possible claim that plaintiffs 
might make is false, rather than requiring plaintiffs now to 
provide justification for their claims. However, the difficulty of 
proving a negative is legendary. All a plaintiff must do is allege 
some as yet unresolved state of affairs that has not been 
studied and claim illness as a result of, say, a defendant’s drug. 
For example, a plaintiff who has taken a variety of drugs, has a 
rare precondition, and has developed a rare illness could 
require every single manufacturer of every drug the plaintiff 
has ever taken to demonstrate lack of causation. In short, the 
most predictable and troubling consequence of Berger’s theory 
is that meritless litigation and settlements will proliferate, 
generating costs which consumers will ultimately be forced to 
bear. Higher litigation and settlement costs for manufacturers 
  
 102 The larger the potential pool of plaintiffs suffering from a given injury, the 
greater a defendant’s incentives to litigate, because the costs of causation studies will 
be outweighed by the potential liability to the pool of plaintiffs. Conversely, smaller 
pools of plaintiffs will decrease defendants’ incentives to litigate, since the costs of 
disproving causation will be more likely to outweigh the costs of settling. Thus, so long 
as the plaintiff crafts an appropriately narrow claim—say, that the defendant 
negligently failed to research drug X’s interaction with drug Y and rare 
precondition Z—the plaintiff can ensure that the defendants incentive to litigate will 
approach zero. A predictable result of Berger’s theory is that defendants will be 
overwhelmed by a torrent of unusual law suits of this sort. They will settle these suits 
because litigation will be exponentially more expensive. There will be many, many 
undeserving plaintiffs who recover under this theory, because economic efficiency 
demands that defendant corporations settle rather than defend in cases where the cost 
of disproving causation is in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars and the 
plaintiff is alleging a relatively unique injury. 
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will translate into higher drug prices for consumers as well as 
fewer drugs being brought to market.103 
B. Professors Berger and Twerski’s Causation-Free Theory 
Professor Berger recently collaborated with Professor 
Aaron Twerski to revise her tort theory. Together, they argue 
that courts ought to recognize an informed choice cause of 
action that would allow plaintiffs claiming injury from 
pharmaceutical products to recover damages for deprivation of 
informed choice when the indicia of a “troubling” and 
“recurring pattern of drug cases” arises:  
(1) the causal relationship between the toxic agent and plaintiff’s 
harm is unresolved at the time of litigation . . . ; (2) the drug is not 
therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or to 
improve lifestyle; (3) it is almost certain that a patient made aware 
of the risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption of the 
drug would have refused to take it; and (4) the defendant drug 
company was aware of the potential risk or should have undertaken 
reasonable testing to discover the risk and failed to provide the 
requisite information to the physician or patient.104 
This theory is interesting and remarkable in its own right. 
Professor David Bernstein critiqued Professors Berger 
and Twerski’s theory and they responded,105 and we do not 
recreate those arguments here. Rather, we raise concerns of 
our own. First, we again address the odd philosophical or 
theoretical aspects of the theory, which differ from those posed 
by Professor Berger’s alternative vision of tort liability. Next, 
we explain how the cause of action they propose will overdeter 
or underdeter due to its failure to account for base incidence 
  
 103 See, for example, the state of affairs in the pre-Daubert Ferebee era, when 
manufacturers rolled back research and development of new drugs and vaccines out of 
fear of litigation in which even unreliable evidence was admissible. Bernstein, supra note 
17, at 467-68. “Ferebee implicitly condoned treating plaintiffs’ experts in toxic tort cases 
as if their status as qualified experts meant that their reasoning and conclusions 
necessarily reflected the views of a reputable segment of their scientific peers.” Id. at 465-
66. And those drugs that do come to market will be covered in warnings—so many, in 
fact, that they may begin to lose meaning. This article’s authors did an informal survey 
and found that the FDA’s most severe warning, so-called “Black Box” warnings, attach to 
drugs for treating acne, depression, menopause, and anxiety. Drugs with Black Box 
Warnings by Therapeutic Class, BLACKBOXRX, http://www.formularyproductions.com/ 
master/showpage.php?dir=blackbox&whichpage=237 (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
 104 Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed 
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005). 
 105 See id.; Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Correspondence, From 
the Wrong End of the Telescope: A Response to Professor David Bernstein, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1983 (2006); Bernstein, supra note 74. 
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rates. Finally, we draw on work in moral psychology to explain 
why juror damage awards will likely approximate full 
compensatory damages instead of the partial damage awards 
that are integral to the theory.  
1. Theoretical Problems: Proximate Cause Without 
Cause-in-Fact 
Professors Berger and Twerski’s theory abandons tort 
law’s causation-in-fact requirement because of the difficulties 
of proving causation in toxic tort cases. The only question is 
whether the defendant’s breach—here, a failure to disclose 
some risk—was a foreseeable cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 
Note that the plaintiff must have suffered an injury, but is not 
required to prove that the defendant’s risky conduct caused the 
injury. The defendant need only have failed to disclose some 
risk—however small—to the plaintiff and the plaintiff must 
have suffered the type of injury within the scope of the risk not 
disclosed. The mechanics of Berger and Twerski’s tort reduces 
to one question: did the defendant breach a duty to the injured 
plaintiff?106 It is of course possible to attach liability to breaches 
of duty, and this is quite common in criminal law. But it is not 
a feature of the tort system. 
It is tempting, and certainly less confusing, to say that 
Berger and Twerski’s theory simply attaches liability to a 
breach of duty, but that is not quite the case. The theory 
requires that a plaintiff have suffered some injury, but people 
frequently breach their duties without causing injury. The 
proposal thus has a conceptual muddle at its center: it 
randomly assigns liability based on a breach of duty, regardless 
of whether the breach of duty actually caused the harm. And of 
course, the “breach of duty” is entirely hypothetical, precisely 
because one does not know that in fact the harm was actually 
caused by the defendant. 
2. Practical Problems: Unforeseen Consequences 
We turn now to the potential consequences of their 
theory. Because plaintiffs under this theory are entitled to 
damages that will only be a portion of compensatory damages, 
  
 106 On this point, see Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective 
Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 220-21 
(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001). 
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disciplining the defendants under Berger and Twerski’s theory 
will be a function of the number rather than the magnitude of 
lawsuits. For example, in the case of drugs and disease, the 
number of lawsuits will turn on baseline rates of the disease 
(as it would if Berger and Twerski’s theory had been applied to 
Bendectin cases, which we now know to be nonteratogenic and 
not the cause of the injuries) rather than the real incidence of 
injury. This problem is most clearly understood through an 
example.  
Consider the recent concerns over potential linkages 
between cell phones and brain cancer.107 Cell phones are not 
necessary for the preservation of life; they simply increase the 
quality of life. Under Berger and Twerski’s theory, if it turns 
out that cell phone manufacturers did not warn of radiation 
risks that a reasonable person would want to know about, 
every person in the United States who uses a cell phone and is 
afflicted with brain cancer would have a cause of action against 
the manufacturer of his or her cell phone, regardless of the 
source of the injury. In other words, plaintiffs would have a 
cause of action regardless of the baseline cancer rates. Even if 
brain cancer rates had remained consistent for a century or 
more, thereby providing strong evidence that cell phones do not 
cause brain cancer, every injured person would have a cause of 
action against the manufacturer. Even in the unlikely event 
that damage awards are small in these cases, the number of 
cases (there are roughly 22,000 new cases of brain cancer a 
year)108 would impose large costs on the manufacturer. But 
given the baseline, it would also very likely result in a windfall 
for many, if not all, of the 22,000 plaintiffs.109 While those cell 
phone users who also suffered loss of informed choice—the 
injury for which plaintiffs recover damages under this theory—
without developing cancer receive nothing, those developing 
cancer, whatever the cause, receive damages. 
By providing recovery for unsubstantiated risks, Berger 
and Twerski almost certainly guarantee a regime in which 
doctors and pharmaceutical manufacturers provide too many 
warnings, which will have the dual effect of not only 
diminishing the force of warnings that reflect a truly serious 
  
 107 A Lexis-Nexis search for news articles with the words “cellular phones” 
and “cancer” pulls more than 3000 articles. 
 108 Brain Tumor Home Page, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/ 
cancertopics/types/brain (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). 
 109 See id.  
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risk, but also deterring people from taking medications that 
they should take.110 If drugs like Bendectin should have come 
with warnings, as Berger and Twerski argue, then many other 
safe drugs will be covered in unnecessary warnings, thus 
diminishing the value of all warnings. A patient will have two 
choices: numb herself to the warnings that cover every pill 
bottle, or refuse treatment with medications that are necessary 
for her, or her fetus’, wellbeing. These outcomes could very well 
be worse than the status quo, but in any event they plainly 
need to be accounted for in proposals like Berger and Twerski’s.  
Finally, as with Professor Berger’s original theory, the 
proposed cause of action would likely lead to increased 
litigation with the predictable effect of driving even some safe 
drugs off the market: 
While successful informed choice actions would individually be less 
remunerative for plaintiffs than successful causation actions would 
be, it would be much easier for plaintiffs to meet the burden of proof 
and persuade judges and juries to rule in their favor. Pharmaceutical 
companies would therefore likely face far more lawsuits for lack of 
informed choice than they ever faced for causation. Under such 
circumstances, “who in his right mind . . . would work on a product 
that would be used by pregnant women?”111 
. . . . 
The jury is then supposed to ignore the causation and damages 
evidence they just heard and dispassionately decide whether the 
evidence of “risk” presented by the plaintiff’s experts warrants 
granting the plaintiff emotional distress damages based on lack of 
informed choice, knowing that if they rule for the defendants on this 
issue, the plaintiff will receive no compensation.112 
A growing body of work in psychology suggests that the 
sort of mental restraints that Berger and Twerski’s work 
requires of jurors may simply not be available to them.113 
  
 110 Omission bias occurs when a more harmful act of omission is preferred to a 
less harmful act of commission. The Psychology of Patient Decision Making, supra note 
50. One rather extreme example of omission bias is choosing to forego a polio vaccine 
during a polio outbreak because there is a one in a million chance of contracting polio 
from the vaccine itself. 
 111 Bernstein, supra note 105, at 1978 (footnotes omitted).  
 112 Id. at 1975. 
 113 See generally Joshua Green & John Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral 
Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002). One of the key ideas is 
“automaticity”—i.e., “the mind’s ability to solve many problems, including high-level 
social ones, unconsciously and automatically.” Id. at 517. 
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3. Juror Confusion: A Moral-Psychological Perspective 
Berger and Twerski’s theory raises a serious question 
about jury decision making: when jurors are faced with a 
plaintiff suffering from some severe and tragic injury, and a 
defendant, often a corporate defendant, is shown to have failed 
to disclose some uncertain risk of causing the injury, it is quite 
possible that a juror’s natural instinct will be to fill the 
causation gap and punish the defendant in order to make the 
plaintiff whole. In this section, we draw on work in the field of 
moral psychology and the burgeoning field of experimental 
philosophy to demonstrate the seriousness of this risk. In the 
field of psychology, we focus on Mark Alicke’s Culpable Control 
Model of Blame Attribution (“CCM”), which provides empirical 
evidence of the potential of Berger and Twerski’s theory to 
adversely affect jury decision making.114 We also discuss Joshua 
Knobe’s work with Ben Fraser on causation and ascriptions of 
blame which also supports the proposition that, all other things 
being equal, an actor who violates a moral norm is more likely 
to be viewed as responsible for a bad state of affairs than an 
actor whose conduct does not violate a moral norm.115 The 
danger of Berger and Twerski’s theory is that it invites such 
misattributions of causation.  
Alicke’s CCM provides a descriptive account of how 
blame attributions are made in ordinary circumstances and 
purports to show “the conditions that increase as well as 
mitigate blame and analyzes the process by which blame and 
mitigation decisions are made.”116 Alicke’s work in the 
psychology of blame indicates that spontaneous evaluations of 
the bad outcome (here the injury to the plaintiff), will directly 
affect blame ascriptions, which jurors will then buttress by 
altering their causal control assessments.117 When jurors’ blame 
ascription mode is turned on by evidence of corporate 
misfeasance or malfeasance, they tend “to over ascribe control 
to human agency and to confirm unfavorable expectations,”118 
  
 114 See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of 
Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556 (2000). 
 115 See Joshua Knobe & Ben Fraser, Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two 
Experiments, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 441, 442 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). 
 116 Alicke, supra note 114, at 557. 
 117 Id. at 565 (“[S]pontaneous evaluations of the outcome directly affected 
blame ascriptions, which participants then buttressed by altering their causal control 
assessments.”). 
 118 Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
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leading persons to “exaggerate evidence that establishe[d] [an 
actor’s] causal or volitional control and de-emphasize 
exculpatory evidence.”119 
In the context of Berger and Twerski’s theory, this could 
easily translate to confirming causation where none exists. To 
see how this works, consider the following study:  
Participants learned that the driver was speeding either to hide an 
anniversary present or a vial of cocaine. Moreover, they learned that 
the driver encountered a number of environmental obstacles—
slippery road, poor visibility, etc. Participants were then asked to 
say whether the driver’s speeding or the environmental factors 
played a greater role in causing the accident. The results showed 
that participants were more inclined to attribute the accident to the 
driver rather than the environmental conditions when the driver 
was hiding the cocaine than they were when he was hiding an 
anniversary gift.120 
The example above may map directly onto jury decision 
making, suggesting that jurors may be more inclined to 
attribute the accident to defendants when the defendants 
performed some antecedently immoral act. Under Berger and 
Twerski’s theory, plaintiffs whose cases would have been 
dismissed on summary judgment for lack of evidence of 
causation will now have an opportunity to bring an action. 
Once in court, plaintiffs’ lawyers will argue that the defendants 
immorally failed to warn of a risk. Alicke’s work suggests that 
“cognitive shortcomings and motivational biases are endemic to 
blame,”121 which means that actions under Berger and Twerski’s 
theory may likely lead to gross overcompensation, a factor that 
Berger and Twerski did not consider. At a minimum, before 
substantial change to the tort system can be adopted, such 
concerns need to be accommodated. 
Recent experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and 
Ben Fraser indicate that moral judgments can directly impact 
causal judgments.122 As they acknowledge, “[i]t has long been 
known that people’s causal judgments can have an impact on 
their moral judgments.”123 For instance, the knowledge that 
someone caused the death of another may lead to the 
  
 119 Id. at 566. 
 120 Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional 
Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality, 9 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS 203, 
207-08 (2006). 
 121 Alicke, supra note 114, at 557. 
 122 Knobe & Fraser, supra note 115, at 441. 
 123 Id. 
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conclusion that the behavior was morally wrong. Knobe and 
Fraser proffer evidence supporting the opposite conclusion: 
negative moral judgments can lead to attributions of causation.  
Knobe and Fraser analyze a hypothetical posed by Julia 
Driver:  
Lauren and Jane work for the same company. They each need to use 
a computer for work sometimes. Unfortunately, the computer isn’t 
very powerful. If two people are logged on at the same time, it 
usually crashes. So the company decided to institute an official 
policy. It declared that Lauren would be the only one permitted to 
use the computer in the mornings and that Jane would be the only 
one permitted to use the computer in the afternoons. As expected, 
Lauren logged on the computer the next day at 9:00 am. But Jane 
decided to disobey the official policy. She also logged on at 9:00 am. 
The computer crashed immediately.124 
When presented with this case, in which both persons were the 
but-for cause, but only one, Jane, breached a duty, people 
frequently respond that Jane caused the crash, not Lauren, 
despite the fact that Jane’s behavior almost perfectly resembles 
Lauren’s. The major difference, the authors argue, is 
normative: Jane’s violation of her obligations influences 
participants’ causal judgments.125 
The problem with Knobe and Fraser’s study, however, is 
that it highlights, but does not clarify, the complexity of the 
legal concept of causation. In the example above, both Jane and 
Lauren are but-for causes of the computer crash, but only Jane 
was the proximate cause of the computer crash.126 Participants 
in Knobe and Fraser’s study may have been intending to 
express this notion when they ascribed causation to Jane. If 
true, Knobe and Fraser’s study highlights the common critique 
  
 124 Id. at 442 (quoting Julia Driver, Attributions of Causation and Moral 
Responsibility, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 115, at 413, 428). 
 125 Id. There is a debate about whether the attributions of causation are due 
to the immorality of Jane’s antecedent acts or merely due to the atypicality of that act. 
Knobe and Fraser highlight Julia Driver’s argument on atypicality: 
Jane’s behavior seems quite atypical for a person in her position, whereas 
Lauren’s behavior seems perfectly common and ordinary. So perhaps people’s 
tendency to pick out Jane’s behavior and classify it as a cause has nothing to 
do with its distinctive moral status. It might be that people simply classify 
Jane’s behavior as a cause because they regard it as atypical. 
Id.; see also Julia Driver, Kinds of Norms and Legal Causation: Reply to Knobe and 
Fraser and Deigh, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 115, at 459. 
 126 Jane’s use of the computer was the legal or proximate cause of the crash, in 
the sense that it involved an “unreasonable risk of: (1) causing harm to a class of 
persons of which the other is a member and (2) subjecting the other to the hazard from 
which the harm results.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965). 
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of experimental philosophy: that opinion polling is often too 
blunt an instrument to tease out the concepts being studied.127 
Nonetheless, Knobe and Fraser’s findings do make the 
intuitively obvious point that jurors may be more likely to 
attribute causation to defendants who have performed some 
act—like failing to disclose a risk, however small—that makes 
the subsequent injury more foreseeable. And this is precisely 
what Berger and Twerski’s theory sets jurors up to do. In a 
typical case, a corporation will be shown to have not disclosed 
some risk with regard to a substance; a plaintiff that has 
ingested that substance and subsequently developed some 
tragic illness. Under Berger and Twerski’s theory, the jury is 
supposed to coolly and rationally put the question of causation 
out of their minds and simply punish the defendants for their 
failure to warn the plaintiffs. A more likely result, supported 
by Knobe and Fraser’s research, is that jurors will attribute 
causation in situations like these—either explicitly, in the form 
of a judgment, or tacitly, in the form of larger damage awards 
for violation of the failure to warn tort. 
IV. SKAPP’S STUDY OF DAUBERT IN THE DELAWARE 
COURTS: IS THERE A PROBLEM?  
The concerns about Daubert and the resultant solutions 
all turn on assumptions about the effects of Daubert. SKAPP 
funded a study by the National Center for State Courts to 
gauge these effects in Delaware courts.128 That study found that 
the effects of Daubert have been minimal.129 As SKAPP’s own 
  
 127 For further critiques of experimental philosophy, see Antti Kauppinen, The 
Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy, 10 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 95 (2007); 
S. Matthew Liao, A Defense of Intuitions, 140 PHIL. STUD. 247 (2007); Kirk Ludwig, The 
Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First versus Third Person Approaches, 31 
MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 128 (2007); Ernest Sosa, Experimental Philosophy and 
Philosophical Intuition, 132 PHIL. STUD. 99 (2006). 
 128 WATERS & HODGE, supra note 79, at 2. Delaware is among a number of 
states that have adopted Daubert at the state court level. Id. at 5. 
 129 Id. at 21. Waters and Hodge concluded: 
The overall impact of Daubert has been minimal compared to what was 
originally feared when the decision came down from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Delaware Superior Court was not affected by excessive or unnecessary cost or 
delay as a result of Daubert. Although Daubert has created additional 
barriers to civil plaintiffs’ ability to bring their case to trial, the impact has 
been isolated to a small number, albeit important and complex, cases. As 
confirmed in other work in this area, challenges to expert witness testimony 
are not a frequent occurrence in either civil or criminal cases in the Delaware 
Superior Court. The practice of holding Daubert hearings is even less 
frequent. Daubert motions appeared most frequently in mature cases ready 
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study would seem to be credible evidence to judge its positions, 
we discuss it briefly below.130 
Prior to SKAPP’s study, many of the extant studies of 
the effects of the Daubert trilogy relied on content analysis of 
appellate opinions.131 Because studies of appellate opinions are 
subject to selection bias, the authors of the SKAPP-funded 
study set out to directly explore whether and to what extent 
the Daubert trilogy has affected the ways courts handle expert 
witness testimony. The authors researched products liability 
and criminal cases in Delaware pre-Daubert from the years 
1989-1993 and post-Daubert from the years 1999-2004.132 The 
authors surveyed all 126 product liability cases during that 
time period as well as 1950 cases of felony rape and murder.133 
Additionally, they conducted interviews with judges and 
lawyers about Daubert’s effect on the case.134 The authors found 
only twenty cases in which a litigant moved to exclude expert 
witness testimony.135 Ten of the cases were pre-Daubert and ten 
were post-Daubert.136 Of the twenty disputes many revolved 
around “duo-experts,” involving, for example, a bio-engineering 
expert to explain the causal mechanism of an injury and a 
medical expert to explain the injury itself.137 Usually, the 
motions were to ensure that the expert testifying about 
causation did not testify about injury and the expert testifying 
about injury did not testify about causation.138 
  
for trial, and judges typically rendered a ruling on the expert’s deposition and 
attorneys’ briefs. Daubert hearings were reserved for complex civil cases and 
occasionally entertained during a criminal trial. 
Id. 
 130 Note that the small numbers impair its generalizability, but there should 
be no question about bias. 
 131 See Henry F. Fradella, Lauren O’Neill & Adam Fogarty, The Impact of 
Daubert on Forensic Science, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 323 (2004); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., 
The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal 
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 344 (2002); D. Michael Risinger, 
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the 
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000); Rob Robinson, Does CSI Lie? The New 
Institutionalism and the Treatment of Forensic Evidence by Federal Courts under 
Daubert, (Apr. 7, 2005) (paper presented at the meeting of The Midwest Political 
Science Association). 
 132 WATERS & HODGE, supra note 79, at 8, 10. 
 133 Id. at 10. 
 134 Id. at 2. 
 135 Id. at 15. 
 136 Id.  
 137 Id.  
 138 Id. 
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The authors’ findings and conclusion disconfirm 
SKAPP’s prediction that Daubert portends disaster for 
plaintiffs. The authors found that motions in limine were 
treated roughly the same before and after Daubert,139 but that 
post-Daubert, the disposition less often resulted in a jury or 
bench trial.140 And when the motions were granted, a partial 
exclusion of the testimony or a limiting of the scope of 
admissible testimony resulted more frequently than a complete 
exclusion of an expert.141 They found “no differences between 
the pre-Daubert and post-Daubert cases in the number of 
summary judgments entered.”142 The courts were not overrun by 
cost or delay, due in no small part to judges’ ability to handle 
the new challenges.143 Overall, Daubert hearings were found to 
be isolated to a small number of important and complex cases.144 
Expert testimony was challenged in only sixteen percent of 
product liability cases and eight percent of felony murder and 
rape cases.145 The study concluded that “[t]he overall impact of 
Daubert has been minimal compared to what was originally 
feared when the decision came down from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.”146 
SKAPP argues elsewhere that Daubert has chilled 
plaintiffs from bringing suits.147 Evidence supporting this 
proposition is said to be in the results of a 2002 RAND 
Institute study, which “found that after an initial spike in the 
number of challenges to expert testimony, the incidence began 
to fall off dramatically.”148 From this SKAPP concludes that the 
fall in challenges occurred because “plaintiffs increasingly 
decided not to bring actions that relied heavily upon scientific 
testimony unless that testimony met the Daubert standards.”149 
However, the decrease in the number of Daubert challenges 
might just as well be due to the fact that defendants choose not 
to pursue Daubert challenges or because the system quickly 
settled back into something approximating its previous status 
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quo. Interestingly, SKAPP’s Delaware study confirms this 
point. Although the evidence gathered from Delaware suggests 
that SKAPP’s critiques may miss the mark, obviously much 
more empirical work is necessary to fully assess the effects of 
the Daubert trilogy in state courts.150 
V. CONCLUSION 
We end where we began. Daubert has not been an 
unmitigated success, but the recent criticisms of it, whatever 
their motivation, seem more likely to achieve an unjustified 
redistribution of wealth with predictable negative social 
consequences. We understand the impulse that yearns to 
provide the unfortunate person solace, but we do not 
understand the failure to contextualize the consequences of 
redistribution schemes, many of which may make more persons 
worse rather than better off. 
The SKAPP study discussed in Part IV suggests that 
critics of Daubert are focusing on the wrong implications of the 
precedent in formulating their criticisms and alternate 
theories. For example, Berger and Twerski assume that 
Daubert will result in fewer plaintiffs being able to bring 
successful toxic tort claims. However, the real problem with 
Daubert—the problem that Berger and Twerski do not 
address—is epistemological in nature, and concerns the 
conditions that permit rational deliberation about expert 
testimony. This problem raises serious questions about the 
dangers of leaving fact finders to choose among experts based 
on credentials, demeanor, or epistemically arbitrary criteria. 
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The solution is not relaxing the overall standard for expert 
testimony, nor is it creating new theories of liability based on a 
hodgepodge of otherwise inadmissible evidence, particularly if 
those theories will lead to excessive and unnecessary warnings. 
Substantive justice in the context of expert testimony will be 
the result of procedures that lead to the truth. 
The real problem with Daubert cannot be corrected by a 
formal test or by the redistribution programs discussed above. 
The real problem that Daubert highlights is how incompatible 
the use of incomprehensible scientific or technical evidence is 
with basic notions of justice. The solution is not more injustice 
that happens to be more equally distributed, or more injustice 
in the name of helping the unfortunate. The solution is to deal 
with the problem—the informational vulnerability of the law. 
Daubert should be extended rather than cut back. All evidence, 
not just lay evidence, should truly be tested by relevance and 
reliability. Ironically, the Daubert court inadequately 
appreciated the relevance component rather than inadequately 
treated the reliability component, which is the standard 
critique of the case. Evidence cannot be relevant unless it can 
be understood. Daubert requires the trial judge to understand 
the evidence, but does not require the trial judge to require the 
jury to understand it. That is the deep flaw in Daubert and the 
flaw that should be corrected by rejecting the deferential model 
of decision making it encourages. 
